Conflict of Law and Surreptitious Taping of Telephone Conversations by Bast, Carol M.
NYLS Law Review 
Vols. 22-63 (1976-2019) 
Volume 54 
Issue 1 New York Law School Law Journal 
Alumni Issue 
Article 6 
January 2009 
Conflict of Law and Surreptitious Taping of Telephone 
Conversations 
Carol M. Bast 
University of Central Florida, Orlando 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review 
 Part of the Communications Law Commons, Conflict of Laws Commons, Constitutional Law 
Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Carol M. Bast, Conflict of Law and Surreptitious Taping of Telephone Conversations, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
147 (2009-2010). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
VOLUME 54 | 2009/10
Carol M. Bast
Conflict of law and surreptitious taping 
of telephone Conversations
aBoUt tHE aUtHor: Carol M. Bast is an associate Professor of legal studies, Department of 
Criminal Justice and legal studies, at the University of Central Florida, orlando, Florida 32816; 407 924-
4220; email cbast@mail.ucf.edu. 
147
148
COnfLiCt Of Law and SUrrEptitiOUS taping Of tELEphOnE COnVErSatiOnS
I. INTRODUCTION
 Hardly a day passes without communicating with someone via the telephone. 
the prevalence of cellular telephones has only increased our ability to reach out and 
touch someone from virtually any location. often, one party to the telephone 
conversation audiotapes the conversation to have a record of what the parties 
discussed—out of simple curiosity; to take notes of the substance of the conversation; 
to gather information that could put the person taping at a social, political, or 
economic advantage; or to gather evidence in anticipation of litigation.
 although the federal government and a majority of states allow surreptitious 
taping of a telephone conversation with one-party consent, this practice violates state 
statutes in ten states.1 thus, courts are faced with the question: What law applies 
when surreptitious taping of a telephone conversation involves more than one 
jurisdiction, and one jurisdiction requires all parties to consent and the other does 
not? this paper explores how courts have dealt with this question.2
 In Part II, this paper provides the reader with background on wiretapping 
statutes. In Part III, the various conflict of law approaches among the states are 
outlined. In Part IV, this paper delves into the question of whether the courts have 
followed the conflict of law approaches of the various states. In Parts V and VI, this 
paper examines cases dealing with this question; first from a conf lict of law 
perspective, then from the perspective of whether the court has jurisdiction over the 
defendant, and finally from the perspective of whether an exclusionary rule applies. 
In Part VII, a discussion of the variables in surreptitious interstate taping of telephone 
conversations is presented. In Part VIII, the final section attempts to provide some 
analysis that might be helpful in future cases.
 the lesson to be learned is that one should be wary of surreptitiously taping a 
telephone conversation because this practice can easily subject the person taping to 
civil penalties and criminal charges. the person surreptitiously taping a telephone 
conversation may not know whether it is legal to do so in the state where the taping 
is made or whether it is legal to do so in the state where the non-consenting party is 
located. as a result of increasing cellular telephone usage, the person may not even 
know the state in which the other party to the conversation is located.3 the situation 
is further complicated if the telephone conversation is a conference call with multiple 
parties to the conversation potentially located in two or more states.
1. See infra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
2. this paper does not discuss cases in which the conversation and the secret taping occurred in one 
jurisdiction and the government seeks to use the taped information in another jurisdiction, nor does it 
discuss cases involving the Federal Wiretapping act.
3. With cellular telephones, the area code is no longer a reliable indicator of the geographical location of 
the caller. a person desiring to surreptitiously tape a conversation could inquire where the other party is 
located, but the response might not be accurate.
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II. FEDERAL AND STATE WIRETAPPING STATUTES
 to discuss the choice of law question concerning a surreptitiously taped telephone 
conversation, one must first understand the basics of federal and state wiretapping 
statutes. this section summarizes the most important principles of the federal 
wiretapping statutes, and then provides an overview of state wiretapping statutes.
 Federal wiretapping statutes [hereinafter the “Federal act”]4 make it a crime to 
secretly audiotape (“intercept”)5 a telephone conversation (“a wire communication”),6 
to use the information on an illegally made tape, or to disclose the information that 
was illegally taped.7 there are, however, certain exceptions to this protection afforded 
telephone conversations under the Federal act. the Federal act allows someone 
who is a party to the telephone conversation to surreptitiously tape the conversation 
so long as the purpose of the taping is other than to commit a crime or tort.8 In 
4. 18 U.s.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006).
5. See § 2510(4).
6. the Federal act protects oral communication, wire communication, and electronic communication 
against being intercepted illegally. an oral communication is a face-to-face conversation made with a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. See § 2510(2). a violation of the Federal act with respect to an oral 
communication is generally referenced as eavesdropping. a telephone conversation is usually classified as 
a wire communication because it is audible by the human ear. See § 2510(1). section 2510(1) provides:
“[W]ire communication” means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the 
use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or 
other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including 
the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person 
engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or 
foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
 Id. an electronic communication is digital information. § 2510(12). although a telephone conversation 
may very well be transmitted digitally at some point, it is not usually thought of as an electronic 
communication because it is audible by the human ear at at least one point during transmission.
[t]he term “wire communication” means the transfer of a communication which 
includes the human voice at some point. . . . thus, a wire communication encompasses 
the whole of a voice telephone transmission even if part of the transmission is carried by 
fiber optic cable or by radio—as in the case of cellular telephones. . . . the conversion 
of a voice signal to digital form for purposes of transmission does not render the 
communication non-wire. the term “wire communication” includes existing telephone 
service, and digitized communications to the extent that they contain the human voice 
at the point of origin, reception, or some point in between.
 H.r. rep. No. 99–647 (1986); s. rep. No. 99–541, at 12 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.s.C.C.a.N. 
3555, 3566.
7. See 18 U.s.C. § 2511(1).
8. § 2511(2)(d). sub-section (d) provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to 
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the 
communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior 
consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose 
of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of 
the United states or of any state.
 Id.
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addition, a police officer may secretly tape a telephone conversation if the police 
officer is a party to the conversation, or a party to the conversation consents to the 
police officer surreptitiously taping the conversation.9 Meanwhile, the government 
can obtain a court order to surreptitiously tape a telephone conversation without the 
consent of any party to the conversation.10 the penalty for violating the Federal act 
is up to five years imprisonment or a fine,11 and an illegally taped telephone call is 
inadmissible as evidence in a trial.12 the Federal act also provides for civil lawsuits. 
a person whose telephone conversation has been surreptitiously taped in violation of 
the Federal act has a private right of action for compensatory damages, punitive 
damages, attorney’s fees and costs, and can obtain injunctive relief.13
 all of the fifty states, except for Vermont, have statutes protecting the privacy of 
telephone conversations. Many state wiretapping statutes contain provisions similar 
to those contained in the Federal act and generally permit taping upon the consent 
of one party to the telephone conversation. other statutory provisions in those states 
largely mirror the federal provisions.14
 one fifth of the states permit a party to surreptitiously tape a telephone 
conversation only upon consent of all parties to the conversation. these all-party 
consent states are California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Montana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington.15 all-party consent is 
9. § 2511(2)(c) (“It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to 
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the communication 
or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.”).
10. See 18 U.s.C. §§ 2516–2519.
11. § 2511(4)(a). section 2511(5)(a) allows the government to obtain an injunction against further violation. 
See § 2511(5)(a); See also § 2521 (the government may obtain an injunction against someone violating the 
Federal act).
12. § 2515. section 2515 provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents 
of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence 
in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, 
officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United 
states, a state, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information 
would be in violation of this chapter.
 Id.
13. § 2520.
14. see supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text. See also Carol M. Bast, What’s Bugging You? Inconsistencies 
and Irrationalities of the Law of Eavesdropping, 47 DePaul l.rev. 837 (1998). Until 1999, Delaware was 
an all-party consent state. With the passage of new statutes in 1999, it became a one-party consent state. 
Del. Code ann. tit. 11, §§ 2401–2409 (2007).
15. From reading its statute, Michigan would seem to be an all-party consent state; however, case law has 
interpreted Michigan’s wiretapping statute to allow surreptitious taping upon one-party consent. the 
theory behind this case law interpretation is that a party cannot “intercept” the party’s own conversation. 
Bast, supra note 14, at 878–81. although the Connecticut statutes allow one party to a face-to-face 
conversation to surreptitiously tape the conversation, the statutes require all-party consent to tape a 
telephone conversation. Id. at 927.
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required when the parties to a telephone conversation are private individuals; however, 
in those states, the general rule is that a party to the telephone conversation can tape 
the conversation so long as the consenting party is a police officer or informant. 
other statutory provisions in those states largely mirror the federal statutes.16 
 the following section provides basic information on the various conflict of law 
approaches.
III. CONFLICT OF LAW APPROACHES VARY AMONG THE STATES
 one determinate in predicting the result a court will reach in a surreptitious 
taping case is the conflict of law approach followed by a particular state, with the 
states varying in their approaches. Classification of the conflict of law approach of a 
particular state can be problematic because the case law in the state may not be 
particularly clear, and the approach may differ depending on whether the subject 
matter of a case is tort or contract. symeon C. symeonides identified seven conflict 
of law approaches with regard to tort cases: the traditional approach (i.e., lex loci 
delicti), the significant contacts approach, the second restatement approach, the 
interest analysis approach, the lex fori approach, the better law approach, and the 
combined modern approach.17
 as of January 2007, with regard to tort cases, ten states followed the traditional 
approach, two states and Puerto rico followed the significant contacts approach, 
twenty-three states followed the second restatement, two states and the District of 
Columbia followed the interest analysis approach, two states followed the lex fori 
approach, five states followed the better law approach, and six states followed the 
combined modern approach.18 
 the traditional approach to torts was the foundation of the restatement (First) 
of Conflict of laws.19 the territoriality concept is powerfully reflected in the portion 
16. See Bast, supra note 14. some all-party consent states require authorization prior to a police officer or an 
informant surreptitiously taping a telephone conversation, or the states limit the taping to gathering 
evidence of certain types of crimes. For example, New Hampshire and Washington require authorization 
in advance of the taping. See infra notes 113–16, 149–54, 177 and accompanying text.
17. symeon C. symeonides, the american Choice-of-law revolution in the Courts: past, 
present and Future 64 (2006) [hereinafter symeonides, Choice of law revolution].
18. symeon C. symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2006: Twentieth Annual Survey, 54 am. 
J. Comp. l. 697, 712–14 (2006). the ten states following the traditional approach are alabama, Georgia, 
Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, south Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming. the two states following the significant contacts approach are Indiana and North Dakota. 
the twenty-three states following the second restatement are alaska, arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
ohio, oklahoma, south Dakota, tennessee, texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. the two states 
following the interest analysis approach are California and New Jersey. the two states following the lex 
fori approach are Kentucky and Michigan. the five states following the better law approach are 
arkansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, rhode Island, and Wisconsin. the six states following the 
combined modern approach are Hawaii, louisiana, Massachusetts, New York, oregon, and 
Pennsylvania. Id.
19. See restatement (First) of Conflict of laws § 378 (1934).
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of the First restatement concerning torts, with the physical location of the tort 
determining which state’s law is to be applied.20 the First restatement was 
mechanical in operation, with the result of the lawsuit being tied to the location of 
the tort, rather than other, perhaps more appropriate, factors. the result, however, 
was predictable; it gave the law certainty, and made it less likely for the plaintiff to 
forum shop to obtain the best result.21
 a court following the restatement (second) of Conflict of laws approach in a 
torts case must consider sections 6 and 145 of the second restatement. section 6 
requires the court to consider factors not directly related to the alleged wrong and 
the parties.22 these factors include: the relationships among the states and among 
nations, the policies of the forum state and other states with ties to the alleged wrong 
or the parties, the governmental interests of the forum state and other states with ties 
to the alleged wrong or the parties, the expectations of those involved, the policies of 
the field of law underlying the lawsuit, the predictability of the result reached by the 
forum, and the ability of the forum to determine and apply the law to the lawsuit.23 
In determining the relationship among the various states, the alleged wrong, and the 
parties, section 145 directs the court to consider: the location of the alleged wrong, 
the location of the action that caused the alleged wrong, the tie of each party to one 
or more states, and the location of the parties’ dealings.24
 a court considering a claim that a telephone conversation has been surreptitiously 
taped in violation of a statute, or that information from an illegally taped telephone 
conversation was disclosed, might apply section 152.25 section 152 provides:
In an action for an invasion of a right of privacy, the local law of the state 
where the invasion occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, 
except as stated in § 153, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some 
other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 
6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other 
state will be applied.26
 Comment c to section 152 helps determine the location of the invasion. Comment 
c states:
Place of invasion. When the invasion involves an intrusion upon the plaintiff ’s 
solitude, the place of the invasion is the place where the plaintiff was at the  
20. Id. Under section 378 of the restatement (First), “[t]he law of the place of wrong determines whether a 
person has sustained a legal injury.” Id.
21. symeonides, Choice of law revolution, supra note 17, at 11.
22. restatement (second) of Conflict of laws § 6 (1971).
23. Id.
24. restatement (second) of Conflict of laws § 145 (1971).
25. See infra notes 64–67, 60–71, 117–19, 121, 123–24, 135–39, 141–43 and accompanying text (discussing 
how courts in Connecticut, New York and texas used this section to decide cases involving surreptitious 
taping of interstate telephone conversations).
26. restatement (second) of Conflict of laws § 152 (1971).
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time. When the invasion involves the publication of information about the 
plaintiff, or the appropriation of his name or likeness, the place of the invasion 
is where the complained-of matter was communicated to a person other than 
the plaintiff.27
 Comment f of section 152 deals with the situation in which the invasion of 
privacy and the defendant’s conduct occur in different states—when two states are 
involved, the state in which the invasion occurred is often the state whose law controls 
because the location of the invasion is generally easy to determine, and the defendant 
should usually not be allowed to escape the consequences of the defendant’s action.28 
although the greatest number of states follow the second restatement approach, it 
has been criticized as “too much of a compromise among conflicting philosophies, 
too vague, exceedingly elastic, unpredictable, directionless, and rudderless.”29
 Under the significant contacts approach, the forum considers the significant 
relationships among the various states, the alleged wrong, and the parties—much as 
a court following the second restatement approach would apply section 145 of the 
second restatement.30
 Under the interest analysis approach, the forum considers the governmental 
interests of the states potentially tied to the subject matter of the lawsuit—much as a 
court following the second restatement approach would apply section 6 of the 
second restatement. California, one of the states using the interest analysis approach, 
uses a three step process: first, a court determines whether there is a difference 
between the law of the affected states; second, the court analyzes the states’ laws in 
light of applicable facts to determine if a true conflict exists; and third, the court 
decides which state’s law would be more seriously impaired if the other state’s law 
were applied, and the court then applies the law of the state that would be more 
seriously impaired.31
 Under the lex fori approach, a court follows the law of the forum state except 
where there is an overriding reason to apply the law of another state.32 If the non-
forum state is the interested state, this would be an overriding reason to apply the law 
of the non-forum state. a true conflict is one in which the forum state and another 
state are both interested in the controversy. With a true conflict, the court of the 
forum state would apply the law of the forum state.33
27. restatement (second) of Conflict of laws § 152 cmt. c (1971).
28. restatement (second) of Conflict of laws § 152 cmt. f (1971).
29. symeon C. symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement: A Mixed Blessing, 56 
Md. l. rev. 1248, 1250 (1997) [hereinafter symeonides, Mixed Blessing].
30. See symeonides, Choice of law revolution, supra note 17, at 33, 98–99.
31. Kearney v. salomon smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 922 (Cal. 2006). For a discussion of Kearney, see 
infra notes 56–63 and accompanying text.
32. See symeonides, Choice of law revolution, supra note 17, at 76–81.
33. See id.
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 Under the better law approach, a court begins by considering the location of the 
injury (i.e., lex loci delicti), and then considers five factors: “predictability of results,” 
“maintenance of interstate and international order,” “simplification of the judicial 
task,” “advancement of the forum’s governmental interests,” and “application of the 
better rule of law.”34
 as the name indicates, the six states following the combined modern approach 
fashion their own method for dealing with tort conflict of law cases by choosing 
from the several conflict of law approaches. Hawaii draws on the interest analysis, 
the second restatement and the five factors of the better law approaches.35 
Massachusetts36 and New Jersey37 draw on the interest analysis and the second 
restatement approaches. as judged by the 2006 New York case discussed later in 
this paper, New York seems to use the traditional, interest analysis and the second 
restatement approaches.38 North Dakota draws on the significant contacts and the 
five factors of the better law approach.39 oregon draws on the interest analysis and 
the second restatement approaches, but with an emphasis on the law of the forum.40 
as judged by the three wiretapping cases discussed later in this paper, it is unclear 
which method Pennsylvania uses for dealing with tort conflict of law cases.41 of the 
three cases, the 1992 case seemed to be decided following the traditional approach, 
the 2000 case was decided using the interest analysis approach, and the 2005 case 
was decided under the second restatement.42
 When reviewing surreptitious interstate wiretapping cases, it is interesting to 
consider whether a state has followed the announced conflict of law approach of the 
state. the following section describes cases decided using conflict of law rules and 
compares the approach the courts used with the state’s announced conflict of law 
approach.
IV.  HAVE THE COURTS FOLLOWED THE CONFLICT OF LAW APPROACHES OF THEIR 
VARIOUS STATES?
 It is sometimes difficult to classify the conflict of law approach of a particular 
state, especially when some states lack recent case law discussing conflict of law. 43 
34. schubert v. target stores, Inc., 201 s.W.3d 917, 921 (ark. 2005).
35. See symeonides, Choice of law revolution, supra note 17, at 116.
36. Id. at 115.
37. Earl M. Maltz, Do Modern Theories of Conflict of Laws Work? The New Jersey Experience, 36 rutgers 
l.J. 527, 541–42 (2005).
38. See infra notes 117–19, 121, 123–24 and accompanying text.
39. Daley v. american states Preferred Ins. Co., 587 N.W.2d 159, 160–66 (N.D. 1998).
40. See symeonides, Choice of law revolution, supra note 17, at 115–16.
41. See infra notes 125–30, 132–34 and accompanying text.
42. Id.
43. symeonides, Mixed Blessing, supra note 29, at 1261–62.
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also, some courts choose to analyze a surreptitious interstate wiretapping case by 
determining whether the exclusionary rule applies rather than analyzing the case 
from a conflict of law perspective.44
 as one might imagine, some courts do follow the announced conflict of law 
approach of the state while some do not. as explained in this section, California, 45 
Connecticut, 46 Massachusetts federal court,47 New York,48 and texas49 applied the 
conflict of law approach identified by symeonides when deciding cases concerning 
surreptitious taping of an interstate telephone conversation,50 but Florida,51 
Massachusetts state court,52 New Hampshire,53 Pennsylvania,54 and Washington55 
did not.
 A. California
 In 2006, the California supreme Court decided Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, 
Inc., a case in which Georgia brokers surreptitiously taped telephone conversations 
with California residents Kearney and levy.56 Kearney and levy sued salomon 
smith Barney under the California statute that prohibits secretly recording a 
telephone conversation without the consent of all parties and requested injunctive 
relief and damages or restitution.57
44. See infra notes 172–87 and accompanying text. For example, in a criminal case involving surreptitious 
interstate wiretapping, an oregon intermediate appellate court recognized that the defendant wanted 
the court to use a conflict of law approach for the issue of whether a telephone conversation should be 
suppressed, which the court refused to do. state v. Fleming, 755 P.2d 725, 727 (or. Ct. app. 1988).
45. See infra notes 56–63 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 64–71 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 106–12 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 117–19, 121, 123–24 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 135–43 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 72–97 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 98–105 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 113–16 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 125–34 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 144–55 and accompanying text.
56. 137 P.3d 914 (Cal. 2006). there was no discussion in the case of the reason for the taping, perhaps 
because the trial court dismissed the complaint after sustaining salomon smith Barney’s demurrer. Id. 
at 918. one reason for the taping might be to demonstrate compliance with regulations affecting 
brokers, and the Kearney plaintiffs learned of the surreptitious taping after filing a complaint against 
salomon smith Barney with the National association of securities Dealers (NasD), alleging 
“‘malfeasance, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duties’ in providing advice to them.” Id. the National 
association of securities Dealers rule 3010 requires those firms with a significant number of brokers 
previously employed by firms disciplined by NasD to tape all telephone conversations. Id. at 921 n.3. 
salomon smith Barney, however, was not subject to rule 3010. Id.
57. Id. at 917.
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 Employing the governmental interest analysis, the court found a conflict between 
California’s and Georgia’s interests in the laws of their respective states.58 the court 
decided that the privacy of California residents would be negatively impacted if 
Georgia law (one party consent) was applied, and further, that applying Georgia law 
would put California businesses at a disadvantage, while the requirement that a 
Georgia caller inform the California resident that the conversation was being 
recorded was very light.59 Because the law had been unclear prior to Kearney, the 
court did not allow money damages for past conduct because of Georgia’s interest in 
protecting those who might have secretly taped telephone conversations in the past 
in reliance on Georgia law.60
 the California supreme Court noted that the lower courts feared a legalistic 
“gotcha” if a California resident was able to sue the resident of a one-party consent 
state for surreptitiously taping a telephone conversation with a California resident in 
California and to recover money damages.61 the legalistic “gotcha” concept apparently 
stems from the fact that a small minority of states require all-party consent to tape a 
telephone conversation while an overwhelming majority of the states allow 
surreptitious taping of a telephone conversation on the consent of one party to the 
conversation. In the Kearney civil law context, the California supreme Court 
specifically limited its analysis to the Kearney facts, which involved a series of 
surreptitious tapings by a business, and where there was no allegation that the taping 
was done to gather evidence of criminal or tortious conduct.62 the California 
supreme Court recognized that the penal portion of the statute could arguably apply 
to someone surreptitiously taping a conversation from outside California, but the 
court refused to speculate whether a criminal prosecution under the California 
wiretapping statute would pass constitutional muster.63
 B. Connecticut
 In 2002, in Lord v. Lord,64 the Connecticut superior Court decided a case 
between former spouses in which the former husband, a Connecticut resident, filed 
a complaint against the former wife for breach of their separation agreement and for 
allegedly surreptitiously recording their conversations. apparently, the former wife 
taped most of the telephone conversations while she was in New York (one-party 
consent) and may have taped some other conversations while she was in Connecticut 
58. Id.
59. Id. at 917–18.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 919.
62. Id. at 939.
63. Id. at 928.
64. No. CV010380279, 2002 Wl 31125621 (Conn. super. Ct. aug. 20, 2002).
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(all-party consent).65 Meanwhile, the former husband was in Connecticut when the 
former wife allegedly taped his telephone conversations.66
 the court first considered section 152 of the second restatement and determined 
that the former husband’s privacy was invaded in Connecticut.67 the Lord court then 
considered the seven factors of section 6 of the second restatement:68 the court 
found that (1) Connecticut had an interest in protecting the privacy of telephone 
conversations, (2) New York had declined to extend this protection, (3) it would not 
be unfair to apply Connecticut law to the former wife because she intentionally taped 
the telephone calls that she made into Connecticut, and (4) applying New York law 
would encourage forum shopping.69 the court held that Connecticut law would apply 
because Connecticut had the more significant relationship to the case, and New York 
did not have a greater interest in having its law apply.70 therefore, the court denied 
the former wife’s motion for summary judgment.71
 C. Florida
 Florida generally applies the second restatement approach. In cases from 2004 
and 1998, however, Florida intermediate appellate courts72 said that there could be 
no cause of action unless the words that were surreptitiously taped originated in 
Florida.73 the courts provided no further conflict of law analysis even though both 
cases involved at least two states. In other words, according to those two cases, for 
purposes of applying Florida wiretapping law, the interception occurs where the 
words that were surreptitiously taped were spoken. applying that line of reasoning 
would mean that a resident of a one-party consent state could not hold someone 
liable under Florida law for surreptitiously taping a telephone call even if the person 
doing the taping was in Florida. something analogous to that occurred in the 2007 
case discussed below.
65. See id. at *5.
66. Id. at *1, *4. See infra note 172. the court recognized that there was a 1997 criminal case concerning 
surreptitious taping of a telephone conversation and whether Connecticut or New York law applied. See 
state v. Vincente, 688 a.2d 359 (Conn. app. Ct. 1997). the Lord court distinguished Vincente as a 
criminal case concerning a motion to suppress and involving distinct Connecticut statutes. Lord, 2002 
Wl 31125621, at *5 n.5.
67. Id. at *1, *4. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
69. Lord, 2002 Wl 31125621, at *6–7.
70. Id. at *8.
71. Id.
72. Cohen Brothers, llC v. ME Corp., s.a., 872 so. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. app. 2004); Koch v. 
Kimball, 710 so. 2d 5, 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. app. 1998).
73. See infra notes 75–84 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 190–205 and accompanying text for a 
different interpretation of the term “intercept.”
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 to make matters even more confusing, another line of Florida cases states that 
the interception occurs either where the words are spoken, or where the taping 
occurs.74 this line of cases is discussed later in the paper.
 In 2004, a Florida intermediate appellate court decided Cohen Brothers, LLC v. 
ME Corp.75 the case involved a telephone conference call with at least six participants, 
all members of the Deltom solutions, llC management committee, who were 
located in argentina, Florida, New York, and Puerto rico. the rosconis, then 
located in argentina, secretly recorded the telephone conference call. During the 
call, two individuals (at least one of whom was Deltom’s attorney) were in Miami 
(where the call originated), one individual was in New York, and the other individual 
was in Puerto rico.76
 the Cohen court stated that because the Florida wiretap statute requires either 
that a plaintiff be a Florida citizen or that the interception occur in Florida, the trial 
court correctly dismissed the lawsuit.77 Even though two conference call participants 
were located in Florida, the Miami attorneys were not parties to the lawsuit, and 
there was no allegation that their conversation was wrongly intercepted. the plaintiff, 
Cohen Bros., a New York corporation, was not a Florida resident.78 thus, the court 
affirmed the dismissal of the suit.79
 In 1998, a Florida intermediate appellate court decided Koch v. Kimball.80 Koch 
was an insurance salesperson who lived in Georgia (one-party consent). Because her 
sales territory included Florida (all-party consent), she made frequent trips there. as 
part of her job, Koch called Kimball—Koch’s supervisor who lived in tampa, 
Florida—weekly. on april 24, 1996, Koch, then at home in Georgia, called Kimball, 
then at home in Florida, and surreptitiously taped the telephone conversation. 
Kimball sued Koch in Florida state court under the Florida wiretapping statute for 
secretly taping the telephone conversation.81
 the Koch court found that the interception occurred in Florida because Kimball 
was located in tampa, Florida when Koch surreptitiously taped the telephone 
conversation.82 therefore, the intermediate appellate court held that the trial court 
correctly refused to dismiss Kimball’s lawsuit.83 the Koch court equated interception 
74. See infra notes 190–205 and accompanying text.
75. Cohen, 872 so. 2d 321. See infra notes 190–93 and accompanying text for further discussion of Cohen.
76. Cohen, 872 so. 2d at 322–23.
77. Id. at 323.
78. Id. at 324.
79. Id. at 325.
80. 710 so. 2d 5. See infra notes 190–93 and accompanying text for further discussion of Cohen. See also infra 
notes 161–64 and accompanying text for discussion of a 2008 case that limited the extra-territorial 
effect of Cohen.
81. Koch, 710 so. 2d at 6.
82. Id. at 7.
83. Id.
159
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VolUME 54 | 2009/10
with the location where the surreptitiously taped telephone conversation originated: 
“[t]he interception occurs where the words or the communication is uttered, not 
where it is recorded or heard.”84
 It is interesting to note that the Koch court presumably would have arrived at the 
same result had the court applied the second restatement, which symeonides 
identified as the conflict of law approach followed in the state. although Koch taped 
the conversation while in Georgia, Kimball was located in Florida, Koch visited 
Florida on a very regular basis and called Kimball there weekly, their relationship 
was centered in Florida, and because it is an all-party consent state, Florida has a 
strong interest in protecting against a conversation being taped with less than all-
party consent. thus, under section 145 of the second restatement, the court probably 
would have held that most of Koch’s and Kimball’s significant contacts were with 
Florida. In addition, section 152 would inf luence the court to determine that 
Kimball’s privacy was invaded in Florida. Under section 6 of the second restatement, 
the court would recognize that there is a conflict between Georgia and Florida law, 
but that Florida’s public policy of prohibiting the taping of telephone conversations 
with less than all-party consent should be honored. allowing Koch to escape 
application of the Florida statute would encourage surreptitious taping in a future 
case with similar facts in which the surreptitious taping of a conversation occurred in 
a one-party consent state.
 In 2007, in Leff v. First Horizon Home Loan,85 a federal district court sitting in 
New Jersey in a diversity case ruled that a surreptitiously-taped telephone call was 
not inadmissible under Florida law even though leff, a New Jersey resident, 
apparently surreptitiously taped the telephone call he made to Bergida in New Jersey 
while traveling in Florida.86 Following Koch, the court held that the conversation 
could not be suppressed under Florida law because Bergida was not a Florida resident, 
nor was the conversation intercepted in Florida.87 the conversation would also not be 
suppressed under New Jersey law because New Jersey is a one-party consent state, 
allowing a participant in the conversation to tape the conversation so long as the 
taping is made for other than a criminal or tortious purpose.88
 one might wonder what the Leff and Cohen courts would have done had they 
applied announced conflict of law principles. In Leff, the forum was New Jersey, 
with the federal district court deciding a diversity of citizenship case.89 If the court 
had directly discussed conflict of law, it probably would have followed New Jersey 
84. Id. In arriving at this interpretation of interception, the Koch court relied on State v. Mozo, 655 so. 2d 
1115, 1117 (Fla. 1995), a case involving the taping of a cordless telephone conversation. Koch, 710 so. 2d 
at 7. see infra notes 194–98 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mozo.
85. No. 05-3648, 2007 Wl 2572362 (D.N.J. sept. 4, 2007).
86. Id. at *4–6.
87. Id. at *4–5.
88. Id. at *4–6.
89. Leff, 2007 Wl 2572362.
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conflict of law principles because New Jersey was the forum. New Jersey applies the 
interest analysis approach; therefore, the court likely would have found that New 
Jersey has the greater interest in the controversy and New Jersey allows taping upon 
one-party consent. thus, New Jersey has an interest in protecting a telephone 
conversation against a non-participant recording, but under state law, one has to 
evaluate with whom one is speaking because a party to the conversation can talk 
about or play the tape of the conversation later. In addition, leff and Bergida had a 
business, not a personal, relationship, so Bergida should have known that their 
telephone conversation would be taped. Except for the circumstance of leff traveling 
in Florida at the time of the taping, all of the ties were with New Jersey rather than 
Florida. thus, the Leff court probably would have reached the same result—that the 
taped conversation should not be suppressed—had the federal court applied New 
Jersey conflict of law principles.
 Cohen is an interesting case in that the court used a very mechanical approach, 
stating that the Florida wiretapping statutes were inapplicable because none of the 
plaintiffs were Florida residents, nor was there any allegation that anyone whose 
conversation had been surreptitiously taped complained of the taping.90 First of all, it 
is unclear where the court found the Florida resident basis for a lawsuit. this basis 
for the lawsuit had not been stated in any prior case interpreting the Florida 
wiretapping statutes.91 also, as explained below, there are two different lines of 
reasoning in Florida wiretapping cases as to the location of the interception.92 the 
Cohen court followed the Koch line of reasoning, which ties interception to the 
location where the words originate rather than the location of the taping.93
 Cohen Bros. and Deltom were both plaintiffs in the lawsuit.94 Cohen Bros. had 
its principal place of business in Miami, and Deltom’s attorney, who was located in 
Miami, initiated the telephone conference. thus, the court could have found either 
that Cohen Bros. was a Florida resident or that Deltom, through its Miami attorney, 
complained of the taping, had the court wanted to, and the court might not have had 
to dismiss the lawsuit. there still may have been a problem obtaining Florida 
jurisdiction over the rosconis as it is unclear from the facts what ties they had, if any, 
to Florida. 
 Note that the Cohen court incorrectly considered the expectation of privacy in 
analyzing the taping of a telephone conversation.95 Under Florida law, parties to a 
telephone conversation do not have to have any expectation of privacy for the 
conversation to be protected as a wire communication.96 For a face-to-face conversation 
90. Cohen, 872 so. 2d at 324.
91. See infra notes 173, 190–205 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 190–205 and accompanying text.
93. Cohen, 872 so. 2d at 324.
94. Id. at 323.
95. See id. at 324.
96. See Fla. stat. § 934.02(1) (2008).
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to be protected as an oral communication, however, the parties must have an 
expectation of privacy, and the expectation must be reasonable.97
 Had the Cohen court applied the second restatement approach, it is unclear 
whether the result would have been different. the parties to the lawsuit were from at 
least four different jurisdictions, New York, Florida, argentina and Puerto rico, and 
it is unclear whether the rosconis had the requisite contacts with Florida to avoid 
Constitutional due process concerns, which might arise should a Florida court 
analyze whether it could hold argentinian residents liable under Florida law when 
the taping occurred in argentina.
 D. Massachusetts
 In contrast to all but two other cases in this section, Commonwealth v. Gonzalez98 
was a criminal case coming before the court on Gonzalez’s motion to suppress the 
telephone conversation between Gonzalez, located in Massachusetts (all-party 
consent), and Gonzalez’s one-time friend, Penniman, whose home was in New 
Hampshire (all-party consent). Prior to Gonzalez’s arrest, he called Penniman, but 
Penniman did not answer immediately. rather, a computer-generated message began, 
and Gonzalez’s and Penniman’s conversation was recorded on Penniman’s telephone 
service. Penniman retrieved the recorded conversation and subsequently notified the 
Massachusetts state Police about the contents of the tape.99
 although Gonzalez was a criminal case, the court stated that in civil cases a 
Massachusetts court would apply the law of the state with the most significant 
relationship to the underlying incident and the parties.100 However, because this was 
a criminal prosecution, the court looked at the facts underlying the criminal charges 
rather than the facts underlying the surreptitious taping.101 the court found that 
under this approach, Massachusetts law would apply because Gonzalez and the 
victim resided in Massachusetts, the alleged crime occurred in Massachusetts, and 
Gonzalez was being prosecuted in Massachusetts.102 the court denied Gonzalez’s 
motion to suppress the surreptitiously taped telephone conversation because the 
police were not involved in taping the conversation.103 
 symeonides identified Massachusetts as a state following the combined modern 
approach, with the state using the interest analysis and the second restatement.104 In 
determining that Massachusetts law applied, however, the Gonzalez court seemed to 
97. Cohen, 872 so. 2d at 324–25. See Bast, supra note 14, at 872–74.
98. No. Cr.a.2002-1445, 2004 Wl 503959 (Mass. super. Ct. Mar. 8, 2004). See infra note 176 for further 
discussion of this case.
99. Id. at *1.
100. Id. at *2.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *3.
104. symeonides, Choice of law revolution, supra note 17, at 115.
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use the significant contacts approach rather than the combined modern approach, 
although the resulting application of Massachusetts law probably would have been 
the same whether using the significant contacts approach or the combined modern 
approach. after determining that Massachusetts law applied, the court then seemed 
reluctant to apply the Massachusetts wiretap statutes. although the court could have 
found that Penniman’s taping was either intentional or unintentional, because 
Penniman’s telephone service automatically taped the conversation, a finding that 
the taping was intentional would have made a vital piece of evidence inadmissible 
and could have subjected Penniman to civil or criminal liability. Instead, the Gonzalez 
court decided that the telephone conversation should not be suppressed under the 
general exclusionary rule.105
 the United states District Court for the District of Massachusetts decided two 
cases, each of which involved a surreptitiously taped conversation where the 
conversation was taped outside Massachusetts, and the non-consenting party to the 
conversation was located in Massachusetts. In the 1999 case, MacNeill Engineering 
Co., Inc. v. Trisport, Ltd.,106 MacNeill wanted to amend its complaint to add the 
president of MacNeill as a plaintiff and to add the claim that trisport’s agent in 
England surreptitiously taped a telephone conversation with MacNeill’s president 
while the president was in Massachusetts.107 In the 1986 case, Pendell v. AMS/Oil, 
Inc.,108 smith, one of the plaintiffs, was at home in Massachusetts when an aMs 
agent, located in rhode Island, surreptitiously taped their conversation.109
 In refusing to allow MacNeill to amend its complaint, the MacNeill court relied 
heavily on the opinion in Pendell,110 in which the Pendell court had granted partial 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the illegal wiretapping claim. the 
courts recognized that Massachusetts follows the combined modern approach, 
looking to the second restatement and the interest analysis approaches.111 the 
Pendell court decided that rhode Island law should apply because the taping, the last 
action to occur, took place in rhode Island, the rhode Island resident who did the 
taping could have reasonably thought that rhode Island law would apply, the 
Massachusetts wiretapping statute requiring all-party consent was in the nature of a 
local statute, there was no wording in the Massachusetts statute indicating that the 
statute was to have effect outside of Massachusetts, and the court applying rhode 
Island law would protect privacy, although not to as great an extent as Massachusetts 
law.112
105. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
106. 59 F. supp. 2d 199 (D. Mass. 1999).
107. Id. at 200, 202.
108. No. 84-4108-N, 1986 Wl 5286 (D. Mass. apr. 30, 1986).
109. Id. at *1.
110. MacNeill, 59 F. supp. 2d at 202.
111. Pendell, 1986 Wl 5286, at *2–3; MacNeill, 59 F. supp. 2d at 202.
112. Pendell, 1986 Wl 5286, at *3–5.
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 E. New Hampshire
 In State v. Windhurst,113 Windhurst, accused of murder, filed a motion to suppress 
telephone conversations between him, while in New Hampshire (all-party consent), 
and the victim’s step-daughter, Melanie Cooper, while in Idaho (one-party consent). 
Cooper consented to having her telephone conversations taped by New Hampshire 
police officers and the officers obtained the prior authorization required under New 
Hampshire law to do so.114
 the court proceeded to decide the motion in reference to the exclusionary rule 
and three conflict of law approaches: law of forum state, significant relationship, and 
governmental interest.115 applying New Hampshire law, the court denied the motion 
to suppress the surreptitiously taped telephone conversation.116 It is interesting that, 
even though symeonides identified New Hampshire as a state following the better 
law approach, that was not one of the three conflict of law approaches discussed by 
the court. In any event, had the court followed the better law approach, the result 
would have probably been no different. Neither New Hampshire nor Idaho had any 
real interest in suppressing the surreptitiously taped telephone conversation. the 
police followed the requisite procedures of New Hampshire, the all-party consent 
state, for taping the telephone conversation, and Idaho protects the privacy of 
telephone calls only to the extent of prohibiting surreptitious taping on less than one-
party consent.
 F. New York
 In Locke v. Aston,117 locke, a California resident, and aston, a New York resident, 
engaged in telephone negotiations for two years concerning writing a book together, 
with locke surreptitiously taping the conversations. after locke sued aston in New 
York state court over the failed book deal, aston learned that locke had recorded 
the telephone calls and filed a counterclaim under the California wiretapping statutes 
that require all-party consent prior to taping.118 It is interesting to note that aston, a 
New York resident, was attempting to use a California statute in an offensive move 
to hold a California resident liable for illegal activity that the California resident was 
engaged in while in California.
 the New York court stated that it follows the interest analysis approach, as does 
California,119 but it seemed to analyze the facts and apply conflict of law principles 
113. No. 05-s-1749, 2006 Wl 2075119 (N.H. super. Ct. July 13, 2006).
114. Id. at *1.
115. Id. at *3–6.
116. Id. at *6.
117. 814 N.Y.s.2d 38 (N.Y. app. Div. 2006).
118. Id. at 39–40.
119. Id. at 42.
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much differently than the Kearney court.120 the Locke court stated that, when the 
parties are domiciled in different states, New York choice of law looks at the location 
of the injury and cited to comment c of section 152 of the second restatement as one 
of the deciding factors in Locke.121 as did the Lord court,122 the Locke court found 
that comment c, which ties invasion of privacy to the plaintiff ’s location, was 
applicable to the surreptitious taping of a telephone conversation, and further found 
that the injury occurred in New York because aston was located in New York at the 
times locke surreptitiously taped his telephone calls from California.123 the court 
concluded that New York had the greater interest in the case, especially because the 
language of the California wiretapping statutes explicitly makes the statutes apply to 
California residents, and decided that the trial court should not have allowed aston 
to amend his counterclaim to request relief under the California statute.124
 Presumably, aston could have held locke liable under California wiretapping 
statutes if locke had sued in California. there is no indication why locke chose to 
sue in New York rather than in California, but jurisdictional and wiretapping 
concerns could have swayed locke to sue in New York—it is unclear whether aston 
had any ties with California, other than telephone calls to locke, and suing in 
California would have exposed locke to civil damages and criminal charges.
 G. Pennsylvania 
 In Broughal v. First Wachovia Corp.125 and Larrison v. Larrison,126 the courts 
denied plaintiffs recovery—in Broughal, because Pennsylvania could not impose civil 
liability on someone who taped a telephone conversation from North Carolina;127 
and in Larrison because New York had the greater interest in permitting someone in 
New York to tape a telephone conversation upon one-party consent.128 In Ball v. 
Ehlig,129 the court held that it lacked jurisdiction, but held in the alternative that 
texas law, rather than Pennsylvania law, would apply because texas had the greater 
interest in allowing the person located in texas to tape the telephone conversation 
120. See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text.
121. Locke, 814 N.Y.s.2d at 42.
122. See supra notes 64–67, 69–71 and accompanying text.
123. Locke, 814 N.Y.s.2d at 42.
124. Id.
125. 14 Pa. D. & C.4th 525, 534 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1992).
126. 750 a.2d 895, 899 (Pa. super. Ct. 2000).
127. Broughal, 14 Pa. D. & C.4th at 532–33.
128. Larrison, 750 a.2d at 898.
129. 70 Pa. D. & C.4th 160 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2005), aff ’d, 889 a.2d 107 (Pa. super. Ct. 2005), aff ’d sub nom. 
Heck v. Ehlig, 889 a.2d 122 (Pa. super. Ct. 2005).
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upon one-party consent.130 although symeonides classified Pennsylvania as following 
the combined modern approach, the three Pennsylvania courts that have considered 
conflict of law principles in relation to surreptitious taping of interstate telephone 
calls each used a distinct conflict of law approach.131 the Broughal court used the 
traditional approach,132 the Larrison court used the interest analysis approach,133 and 
the Ball court used the second restatement approach.134
 Had the three courts used the combined modern approach, the result may or may 
not have been different. In all three cases, a reader can feel the reluctance of 
Pennsylvania, a state that imposes liability on less than all-party consent, to hold an 
“innocent” out-of-state private individual, with minimal ties to Pennsylvania, liable 
under Pennsylvania law. this feeling echoes the feeling of the Kearney court, which 
was willing to hold a nationwide business liable under California law, but specifically 
limited its decision to the Kearney facts and seemed reluctant to extend liability to a 
private individual with barely minimum ties to California.
 H. Texas
 In Becker v. Computer Sciences Corp.,135 Becker sued Computer sciences after the 
company discharged him. after the lawsuit had been filed, Computer sciences 
discovered that Becker, its Houston-area representative, had surreptitiously taped a 
number of his telephone conversations with Computer sciences employees located in 
California, and sought to add a counterclaim against Becker for taping the 
conversations in violation of California law.136
 the federal court sitting in texas in a diversity case recognized that it should 
apply texas conflict of law principles and that texas follows the second restatement 
approach.137 the court found that section 152 of the second restatement would 
locate the injury in California.138 other significant contacts triggered by section 145 
were that Computer sciences, with its principal place of business in California, does 
business in texas, the taping occurred in texas, and the relationship of the parties 
was centered in texas.139 
130. Ball, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th at 163–64, 169–70. See infra notes 165–68 and accompanying text for the 
court’s analysis of jurisdiction.
131. See infra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
132. See Broughal, 14 Pa. D. & C.4th at 532–33.
133. Larrison, 750 a.2d at 898.
134. Ball, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th at 167–69.
135. 541 F. supp. 694 (s.D. tex. 1982).
136. Id. at 697.
137. Id. at 703–04.
138. Id. at 704.
139. Id.
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In considering the seven factors of section 6 of the second restatement,140 the court 
found that California had an interest in protecting the privacy of telephone 
conversations, while texas allowed taping upon one-party consent, and Becker had 
relied on the texas wiretapping statutes when surreptitiously taping the telephone 
calls. the court found that the policies of California and texas, in protecting the 
privacy of telephone conversations were similar and noted that comment h to section 
6 directed the court to apply the law of the forum state when the state policies were 
the same but the state laws contained “minor differences.”141 the court further found 
that applying texas law would be easier and would lead to predictability and 
uniformity of results.142 therefore, the court held that texas law would apply because 
texas had the more significant relationship to the case, and the court denied 
Computer sciences’ motion to amend its answer to add a counterclaim.143 
 It is interesting that the federal court quickly and correctly identified the conflict 
of law approach followed by texas and then provided a detailed discussion as to how 
the second restatement applied. 
 I. Washington
 Washington generally applies the second restatement approach. In two cases, 
however, one from 1992 and one from 2006, the supreme Court of Washington 
seemed to apply the traditional approach, focusing on the state in which the telephone 
conversation was secretly recorded.144
 In Kadoranian by Peach v. Bellingham Police Dept.,145 the Bellingham Police 
Department obtained authorization under the Washington wiretapping statutes to 
tape a telephone conversation with George Kadoranian, a resident of British 
Columbia, Canada. the police informant called George Kadoranian’s telephone, and 
the police taped a brief exchange with alice Kadoranian, George’s daughter.146
 the Washington supreme Court, without any reference to a conf lict of law 
analysis, held that the surreptitious taping was authorized because the authorization 
procedure had been followed and the taping occurred in Washington.147 the 
Washington supreme Court further held that alice was not entitled to statutory 
damages for “inadvertent interceptions of inconsequential, non-incriminating 
conversations and communications so long as the interceptions are accomplished 
140. Id. at 703. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
141. Becker, 541 F. supp. at 704–06. 
142. Id. at 706.
143. Id. 
144. See infra notes 145–54 and accompanying text.
145. 829 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Wash. 1992).
146. Id. at 1062–63.
147. Id. at 1064.
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pursuant to valid authorizations; and the communication by Ms. Kadoranian to a 
stranger inquiring whether her father was at home was not a ‘private’ 
communication.”148
 In State v. Fowler,149 Fowler’s stepdaughter was in oregon in 2002 when she 
surreptitiously taped two telephone calls with Fowler at the request of the oregon 
state Police while Fowler was located in Washington. the trial court denied Fowler’s 
motion to suppress the two telephone conversations, and Fowler was convicted in 
Washington state court of several counts of sexual misconduct with the 
stepdaughter.150
 Because oregon is a one-party consent state with regard to telephone 
conversations, the surreptitious taping was legal in oregon.151 However, taping of a 
telephone call by a private individual is illegal in Washington without all-party 
consent. Washington wiretapping statutes, as statutes in most all-party consent 
states, do permit surreptitious taping of telephone conversations upon one-party 
consent if the party taping is a police officer or police informant, but Washington 
requires that this type of taping be authorized in advance by a judge and that the 
taping is permitted only to gather evidence of a felony.152
 the court found that because the oregon taping was legal under oregon state 
law, the taped telephone conversations were properly ruled admissible.153 the court 
emphasized that there was no connection between oregon and Washington 
authorities concerning the investigation of sexual misconduct charges against Fowler 
at the time of the taping and that the result would have been different had oregon 
authorities acted as agents of the Washington authorities.154
 Would the result have been different in Kadoranian and Fowler had the 
Washington courts followed the second restatement approach? the courts did 
consider some of the significant contacts under section 145 of the second restatement, 
noting the location of the parties and the location of the surreptitious taping, which 
was Washington in Kadoranian and oregon in Fowler. Had the courts considered 
section 152 of the second restatement, the Kadoranian court would have found that 
alice’s privacy was violated in Canada, and the Fowler court would have found that 
Fowler’s privacy was violated in Washington. Had the courts followed section 6 of 
the second restatement, they would have had to consider additional factors, among 
which were the interests of the various jurisdictions. therefore, by applying the 
second restatement, the court’s result in Kadoranian probably would have been the 
same, but the court’s result in Fowler might have been different.
148. Id. at 1068.
149. 139 P.3d 342 (Wash. 2006).
150. Id. at 343–45.
151. See or. rev. stat. ann. § 165.540 (West 2009).
152. See Wash. rev. Code ann. § 9.73.090 (West 2009).
153. See Fowler, 139 P.3d at 343.
154. See id. at 347–48.
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 In Kadoranian, the police had attempted to obtain the correct authorization.155 
Even though alice’s privacy had been technically violated, she disclosed nothing 
personal during the taping. However, in Fowler, Fowler was a Washington resident 
and made incriminating statements during the conversation. although Washington 
has a strong interest in protecting the privacy of its residents, as expressed in the 
Washington Constitution and the Washington wiretapping statutes, Fowler’s 
conversations were not suppressed.
 the Fowler court was in a quandary because it wanted to use the telephone 
conversations that the alleged sexual misconduct victim taped at the request of the 
oregon police, but Fowler was in Washington when his conversations were 
surreptitiously taped. Perhaps the more principled decision would have been to 
suppress the conversations because Fowler resided in Washington, his privacy was 
invaded in Washington, and Washington wiretapping statutes require all-party 
consent, without regard to the subject matter of the conversation or the identity of 
the person whose conversation was surreptitiously taped. a number of states have 
considered cases in which surreptitious taping complied with the law of the state 
where the taping occurred but did not comply with the law of the forum state, and 
the authorities in the state where the taping occurred were not agents of the authorities 
of the forum state. the majority of states considering this type of case have held that 
when the taping was legal under the laws of the state, the surreptitiously taped 
conversation is admissible even if it would have otherwise been inadmissible under 
the forum’s wiretapping statutes.156 Maryland, for example, is in the minority on this 
question.157 the Fowler decision is thus in line with the majority. 
 the cases previously discussed in this section are from California, Connecticut, 
Florida, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, texas, and 
Washington. of those nine states, only two—New York and texas—are one-party 
consent states. the Massachusetts and New Hampshire cases and one of the cases 
from Washington are criminal cases, and the rest are civil cases. In the criminal 
cases, the courts discuss wiretapping statutes because the criminal defendant wants 
to have a crucial telephone conversation suppressed. In civil cases, wiretapping 
statutes are discussed because the plaintiff wants to collect damages, the wiretapping 
claim arose as a counterclaim, or one of the parties seeks to have a taped telephone 
conversation ruled inadmissible.
 In the three criminal cases, Windhurst, Gonzalez, and Fowler, none of the courts 
suppressed the surreptitiously taped telephone conversations. Windhurst, the New 
Hampshire case, was an easy case in that the police provided Windhurst the 
protection afforded under the New Hampshire all-party consent statute, which 
155. See Kadoranian, 829 P.2d at 1063.
156. Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington are in the majority while Maryland and Montana are in the minority. 
Clifford s. Fishman & anne t. McKenna, Wiretapping & Eavesdropping: surveillance in 
the Internet age § 14:19 (3d Ed. 2008).
157. See infra notes 174–75.
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required authorization prior to the surreptitious taping—the police took the 
precaution of obtaining authorization even though the conversation was taped in a 
one-party consent state that did not require authorization in advance so long as one 
party to the telephone conversation consented to the taping. thus, Windhurst’s 
argument that the police should have obtained prior specific authorization to tape 
outside of New Hampshire, which New Hampshire authorities had no jurisdiction to 
do, was a very tenuous argument, but the best that Windhurst could formulate given 
the circumstances.
 as explained above in this section, there was sufficient basis under their respective 
wiretapping statutes for the Gonzalez (Massachusetts) and Fowler (Washington) 
courts to suppress the taped conversations. Cynics might opine that the Massachusetts 
and Washington courts reached the right result in not suppressing defendant’s 
incriminating statements. Without this crucial evidence, the defendants might not 
have been convicted; however, another view is that those decisions created exceptions 
to the wiretapping statutes of those states.
 In civil cases from New York (Locke) and texas (Becker), one party was located in 
each of those one-party consent states, and the other party was located in California. 
In civil cases from California (Kearney), Connecticut (Lord), Florida (Cohen and 
Koch), and Pennsylvania (Broughal, Larrison and Ball), plaintiffs in all-party consent 
states whose telephone conversations were surreptitiously taped were attempting to 
hold individuals in one-party consent states liable for tapings that occurred in one-
party consent states.
 Not surprisingly, New York and texas, both one-party consent states, applied the 
wiretapping statutes of the forum states, disallowing counterclaims for surreptitious 
taping. applying the law of New York, the Locke court denied its resident the 
possibility of collecting damages against a California resident who had taped in 
California in violation of California law. applying the law of texas, the Becker court 
denied a California resident the possibility of collecting damages against a texas 
resident who had taped in texas. although it did not violate the law of the state 
where the taping occurred, the taping did violate the law of the state of the alleged 
injury. thus, because of the facts in the two cases, New York law favored the 
California resident and precluded the possibility of awarding damages to the New 
York resident, while texas law favored the texas resident, precluding the award of 
damages against the texas resident.
 Courts in California, Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania are 
split as to whether plaintiffs in all-party consent states whose telephone conversations 
were surreptitiously taped can hold individuals in one-party consent states liable for 
taping that occurred in one-party consent states. the California, Connecticut, and 
Florida courts allowed liability to be imposed on someone surreptitiously taping a 
telephone conversation from a one-party consent state in what some would perceive 
as a “gotcha” situation, while the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania courts did not. 
the California and Florida cases involved defendants engaged in business in all-
party consent states, and California may or may not extend its ruling to a private 
individual defendant. In contrast, the Connecticut case involved a domestic dispute.
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V.  COURT ANALYSIS FROM A CONFLICT OF LAW PERSPECTIVE OR FROM 
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE
 as discussed above, a court may engage in a conflict of law analysis when faced 
with a case concerning the surreptitious taping of an interstate telephone conversation. 
other issues that might arise are whether a court has jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
party and whether the taped telephone conversation is inadmissible under an 
exclusionary rule because the conversation was illegally taped.
 A. Jurisdiction
 on a preliminary basis, some courts consider whether an interstate telephone call 
from a one-party consent state made to an all-party consent state, which is also the 
forum state, provides the forum with jurisdiction over the person calling from the 
one-party consent state. Cases from California, Florida, and Pennsylvania dealt with 
the issue of whether the forum state had jurisdiction over the out-of-state party.
In Kearney, the California case, the defendant salomon smith Barney questioned 
whether the California state court had jurisdiction over it because the lawsuit was 
grounded on California-Georgia telephone calls surreptitiously recorded by salomon 
smith Barney employees in Georgia. the California supreme Court quickly disposed 
of this issue because of the presence of salomon smith Barney facilities and operations 
in California.158
 In Koch, the earlier of two Florida cases, defendant Koch, a Georgia resident who 
surreptitiously taped a telephone conversation with her boss located in Florida, 
questioned whether the Florida state court had jurisdiction over her. the Florida 
intermediate appellate court quickly disposed of this issue because Koch was a 
salesperson whose sales territory included Florida, she frequently traveled to Florida, 
and she called her boss in tampa, Florida at least once a week.159 the Koch court 
found that Florida did have jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute, and Koch 
had sufficient contacts with Florida such that there was no due process problem with 
a Florida court deciding the case.160
 In Kountze v. Kountze,161 Neely Kountze secretly taped a telephone conversation 
with Edward Kountze while Neely was in Nebraska, a one-party consent state, and 
Edward was in Florida, an all-party consent state. When Edward discovered that his 
conversation had been secretly taped, he sued Neely, claiming civil damages under 
the Florida wiretapping statute.162 Neely’s contacts with Florida included telephone 
calls and attendance at meetings of less than a day each in 1999 and 2002, with these 
158. Kearney, 137 P.3d at 919–20.
159. Koch, 710 so. 2d at 6.
160. Id. at 6–7.
161. 996 so. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. app. 2008) (en banc).
162. Id. at 247–48.
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two trips to Florida extending into week-long vacations.163 the court distinguished 
the Kountze facts from the Koch facts and concluded that Florida lacked personal 
jurisdiction over Neely under the long-arm statute.164
 In Ball, the Pennsylvania case, the lack of jurisdiction was fatal to the plaintiffs’ 
case, which had been filed in Pennsylvania, an all-party consent state.165 the 
individual plaintiffs and their company were located in Pennsylvania, while the 
individual defendants and their company were located in texas.166 the texas 
defendant company served as a sales representative for the Pennsylvania company for 
five years in return for commission payments.167 the contact during that time period 
between the two companies was only by email and telephone—the defendants did 
not travel to Pennsylvania and received no products from Pennsylvania.168
 B. Exclusionary Rule
 rather than engage in a conf lict of law analysis, a court may analyze a case 
involving a surreptitiously-taped telephone conversation by determining whether the 
conversation is admissible. If the case is civil, the court will look to the exclusionary 
rule of the wiretapping statutes to determine whether it applies.169 If it is a criminal 
case, the court may either look to the exclusionary rule of the wiretapping statutes or 
to the more general exclusionary rule that buttresses the criminal defendant’s 
constitutional rights.170
 often there is little discussion of why a court used the exclusionary rule rather 
than a conflict of law approach to determine whether a surreptitiously taped telephone 
conversation should be suppressed. In fact, in some cases there seems to be no 
recognition by the court that the motion to suppress could be considered by applying 
a conflict of law analysis. one reason may be that some states, like New York, make 
a distinction between procedural and substantive law and view the issue of whether a 
163. Id. at 248–49.
164. Id. at 249–50. Both Koch and Kountze were decided by the Florida second District Court of appeal, 
with Koch a panel decision and Kountze an en banc decision. In Kountze, the court took the opportunity 
to explicitly “recede” from Koch. Id. at 247. “[W]e now conclude that a Florida statute that creates a 
private cause of action for the nonconsensual interception of a communication originating within Florida 
cannot transform a defendant’s out-of-state act of recording that communication, standing alone, into a 
‘tortious act within this state’ for jurisdictional purposes.” Id. at 248. In dicta, the court indicated that a 
telephone call might provide a Florida court with personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if 
the communication was “defamatory, fraudulent, or otherwise an element of a traditional intentional 
tort under the common law.” Id.
165. Ball, 70 Pa. D. & C.4th at 163–66.
166. Id. at 162.
167. Id. at 166.
168. Id.
169. See supra notes 12, 14, 16.
170. See supra notes 104–05, 115–16.
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surreptitiously taped telephone conversation should be suppressed as procedural.171 In 
dealing with procedure, conflict of law principles direct the court to apply the law of 
the forum. In dealing with substantive laws, however, a state may theoretically apply 
the law of another state, depending on the conflict of law approach of the forum state.
VI.  CASES IN WHICH A COURT DETERMINED WHETHER AN EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
APPLIED
 the cases in this section are from seven states: Connecticut (State v. Vincente172), 
Florida (Thompson v. State173), Maryland (Perry v. State174; Mustafa v. State175), 
Massachusetts (Commonwealth v. Gonzalez176), New Hampshire (State v. Windhurst177), 
New York (I.K. v. M.K.178; People v. Capolongo179), and oregon (State v. Fleming180). 
Five of the seven states, Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New 
Hampshire, are all-party consent states, and two of the seven states, New York and 
oregon, are one-party consent states.
 Not surprisingly, because this section concerns the question of whether to exclude 
a surreptitiously taped telephone conversation, all but one of the cases in this section 
are criminal cases, with the underlying criminal charges particularly serious in some 
171. See, e.g., I.K. v. M.K., 753 N.Y.s.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. sup. Ct. 2003).
172. 688 a.2d at 362–63 (applying New York law to prison taping by New York state prison officials in 
assault case). See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text discussing another Connecticut wiretapping 
case.
173. thompson v. state, 731 so. 2d 819, 819–21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. app. 1999) (applying Florida law to affirm 
trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of a recording obtained by police who had 
secretly taped a conversation in a case involving sexual battery on a child less than twelve).
174. Perry v. state, 741 a.2d 1162, 1180, 1189 (Md. 1999) (applying Maryland law in a murder-for-hire case 
to exclude crucial conversation with murderer).
175. Mustafa v. state, 591 a.2d 481, 482–86 (Md. 1991) (applying Maryland law to exclude conversations 
secretly taped by police informant with drug dealers but not at police request).
176. Gonzalez, 2004 Wl 503959, at *2 (applying Massachusetts law to deny motion to suppress surreptitiously 
taped telephone conversation in murder and intent to commit murder case because of lack of police 
involvement in taping). See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text for further discussion of this 
case.
177. Windhurst, 2006 Wl 2075119, at *2, *5 (applying New Hampshire law in denying motion to suppress 
telephone conversation taped by New Hampshire police officers in a murder case while in Idaho but 
with authorization required by New Hampshire law). For further discussion of Windhurst, see supra 
notes 113–16 and accompanying text.
178. I.K., 753 N.Y.s.2d at 829–30 (applying New York law in a custody dispute, because admissibility of 
evidence is procedural, to suppress telephone conversation secretly taped without consent of a 
participant).
179. People v. Capolongo, 85 N.Y.2d 151, 160–64 (1995) (reversing gambling conviction because Capolongo 
had not received fifteen-day notice required by New York law to introduce conversation wiretapped by 
Canadian authorities in Canada).
180. Fleming, 755 P.2d at 725–27 (applying oregon law in a murder, robbery, and burglary case because even 
though Fleming was in Washington, a police officer in oregon secretly taped the conversation with 
consent of a participant in oregon).
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of the cases. Vincente, the Connecticut case, involved assault; Thompson, the Florida 
case, involved sexual battery on a child less than twelve; Perry, the later Maryland 
case, involved a triple murder; Mustafa, the earlier Maryland case, involved illegal 
drugs; Gonzalez, the Massachusetts case, involved murder; Windhurst, the New 
Hampshire case, involved a murder; Capolongo, the New York case, involved 
gambling; and Fleming, the oregon case, involved murder, robbery and burglary. 
the police were involved in the taping in Vincente, Thompson, Windhurst, Capolongo 
(Canadian police), and Fleming. there was no police involvement with the taping in 
Perry, Mustafa, and Gonzalez.
 In each of the criminal cases, except for Capolongo, the court reached a final 
decision as to whether the surreptitiously taped telephone conversation should be 
suppressed, with the court refusing to suppress the surreptitiously taped telephone 
conversation in each case other than the cases from Maryland. the Capolongo court 
remanded the case, allowing the defendant to file a motion to suppress.181
 In Vincente, the Connecticut court did not suppress the taped conversation, but 
the ruling was limited to whether the Connecticut wiretapping statutes, concerning 
the procedure for police tapings, applied to tapings by New York state authorities in 
a federal prison in New York state.182
 as stated above, in a criminal context, Maryland was the only state to rule that a 
surreptitiously taped interstate telephone conversation should be suppressed.183 
Maryland was also somewhat of an anomaly in that the surreptitious taping was not 
illegal in California and the District of Columbia, the jurisdictions in which the 
taping occurred. as explained above,184 Maryland is in the minority of states that 
would suppress a conversation because the taping was made with less than all-party 
consent, as required under Maryland law, even though the taping complied with the 
law of the jurisdiction where the taping occurred. In Perry and Mustafa, the Maryland 
court of last resort confronted hard cases head-on, but refused to take the easy path 
of applying the one-party consent law of the jurisdiction in which the telephone 
conversation was taped. In addition, in Perry, the Maryland court of last resort could 
have agreed with the lower court that the taping was inadvertent, which would have 
made the exclusionary rule inapplicable, but the court refused to do so.
 In Windhurst, the New Hampshire court did something similar to what the 
Maryland court had done, in that the New Hampshire court required that the police 
taping in Idaho comply with New Hampshire wiretapping law.185 Even though the 
court required taping in a one-party consent state to comply with the law of an all-
party consent state, the decision was a relatively easy one for the court because the 
police had obtained the authorization required by New Hampshire law prior to the 
181. Capolongo, 85 N.Y.2d at 166. the lower court decision upon remand is unreported.
182. Vincente, 688 a.2d at 362–63.
183. See supra notes 174–75.
184. See id.
185. See supra notes 113–16, 177.
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taping in Idaho, and thus, the court refused to suppress the surreptitiously taped 
conversation. one wonders what a New Hampshire court would do if faced with 
facts such as those in Perry or Mustafa. the court deciding Windhurst was a lower 
state court, and the result in a surreptitious interstate telephone conversation taping 
case could differ if decided by the New Hampshire court of last resort.
 In Thompson, the Florida court likewise did something similar to what the 
Maryland and New Hampshire courts had done in that the Florida court required 
the police taping the telephone conversation in Florida to comply with Florida law.186 
the police in Thompson, however, easily complied with Florida law because Florida 
allows a police officer to surreptitiously tape a conversation with no more than one-
party consent and without prior authorization. on the other hand, Illinois requires 
authorization prior to the police taping upon one-party consent. thus, the taping in 
Thompson was not in compliance with Illinois law. Florida, a state that in many 
instances is very protective of an individual’s privacy, paid little attention to the 
privacy of thompson, a prior Florida resident. although not apparent from other 
interstate wiretapping cases, Florida follows the second restatement approach to 
conflict of law issues.187 Under the second restatement approach, the result probably 
would have been the same. Most of the significant contacts, except for thompson 
moving to Illinois after the alleged incidents of sexual battery, were with Florida. 
However, section 152 of the second restatement might indicate that Illinois law 
should be applied because thompson’s privacy was invaded there. Even so, a Florida 
court probably would have decided that the section 6 factors of the second 
restatement would have guided the court to apply Florida law.
 In Gonzalez, the court applied an exception that was apparently available to, but 
unused by, the Perry court. Both Gonzalez and Perry were cases in which the 
telephone conversation was surreptitiously recorded on an answering machine. the 
Gonzalez court decided that the taping was inadvertent, while the Perry court decided 
that the taping was not inadvertent. In Gonzalez, the parties to the telephone 
conversation were both located in all-party consent states: Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire. thus, without this exception, the telephone conversation would have 
been suppressed either under Massachusetts or New Hampshire law.
 the Fleming reasoning was similar to the reasoning in Perry, Mustafa, Windhurst, 
and Thompson, in that the Fleming court required the surreptitious taping by the police 
to comply with the wiretapping law of the forum. as in Windhurst and Thompson, 
compliance with the law of the forum, oregon, was painless because oregon is a one-
party consent state that allows taping upon one-party consent. thierman, the other 
prime suspect in the Fleming incident, was presumably easily convinced to allow the 
police to surreptitiously tape his telephone conversation with Fleming, perhaps hoping 
to escape a conviction or, if convicted, to receive a lighter sentence.
 In reviewing the criminal cases discussed in this section, one could conclude that 
the Maryland court reached principled decisions in Perry and Mustafa, but one might 
186. See supra note 173 and infra note 205 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 18.
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wonder if the result, particularly in Perry, was just. the suppression of the twenty-
two second tape in Perry might mean that a hired killer would go free. Cynics might 
opine that the Thompson, Gonzalez, and Fleming courts reached the right result by 
not suppressing defendant’s incriminating statements. Without this crucial evidence 
the defendants might not have been convicted. another view, however, is that those 
decisions created exceptions to the wiretapping statutes of those states.
VII.  THE VARIABLES IN SURREPTITIOUS INTERSTATE TAPING OF TELEPHONE 
CONVERSATIONS
 When considering the legality of a surreptitiously taped telephone conversation, 
one must consider who taped the telephone conversation, the location of the person 
taping it, the location of the person whose telephone conversation was taped, and the 
forum state.
 For example, it would be important to know whether the person was a private 
individual or a police officer and whether the person was a party to the conversation. 
a private individual who is a party to a telephone conversation can surreptitiously 
tape a conversation in one-party consent states, but may tape the telephone 
conversation only with the consent of all parties to the conversation in all-party 
consent states. What if the person taping were a police officer? Generally, a police 
officer may surreptitiously tape a telephone conversation if the officer is a party to 
the conversation or a party to the conversation has consented to the taping, but in 
some all-party consent states, a police officer is prohibited from doing so at all, may 
be permitted to do so only in certain types of cases, or may be permitted to do so 
only with prior authorization.188 also, a police officer may surreptitiously tape a 
telephone conversation, even without any party’s consent, pursuant to a court order. 
In many states the requirements for obtaining a court order are quite detailed, with 
the procedure for obtaining a court order more difficult to follow than the procedure 
for obtaining a warrant. the requirements for obtaining a court order differ from 
state to state; thus, government compliance with the procedure for obtaining a court 
order in one state may not necessarily mean that the government has complied with 
the procedure for obtaining a court order in another state.
 the state in which the activity is located is important in at least three respects. 
the legality of the surreptitious taping may be dependent on the state in which the 
telephone conversation is taped, the state in which the non-consenting party to the 
telephone conversation is speaking, or the state in which the case is tried, in other 
words the forum state.
 the following are possible locations of the surreptitious taping and the person 
taped:
1.  the surreptitious taping occurred in an all-party consent state 
and the person taped was located in a one-party consent state.
188. See supra notes 113–16, 149–54, 177 and accompanying text.
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2.  the surreptitious taping occurred in a one-party consent state 
and the person taped was located in an all-party consent state.
3.  the surreptitious taping occurred in an all-party consent state 
and the person taped was located in an all-party consent state.
4.  the surreptitious taping occurred in a one-party consent state 
and the person taped was located in a one-party consent state.
 Most of the cases in which conflict of law questions arise involve scenarios 1 and 
2 because there is an obvious conflict between the law of a one-party consent state 
and an all-party consent state. Usually, scenarios 3 and 4 do not involve a conflict of 
law question because the consent requirement is similar in the two states. However, 
the facts underlying surreptitious taping cases are not necessarily limited to two 
states, as illustrated in the following section (the above scenarios do not account for 
the domiciles of the parties). 
 the conflict of law approach of the forum state is an additional variable. In any 
of the above scenarios, the forum could be the state in which the taping occurred, the 
state in which the person being taped was located, or in a third state. In a few cases, 
either the surreptitious taping occurred outside the United states or the person taped 
was located outside the United states and the forum was within the United states. 
this paper is limited to these scenarios.
 A. Location of the Wrong
 In a state that bases its choice of law decisions on the location of the wrong, does 
the wrong occur where the plaintiff is injured, or where the last event necessary for 
the wrong occurred? Florida is a state with two conflicting lines of cases concerning 
the location of the wiretapping tort.189
 In Cohen, the Florida intermediate appellate court stated that an appropriate 
plaintiff under Florida’s all-party consent wiretapping statute was either a Florida 
resident or someone whose telephone conversation was surreptitiously taped while 
that person was located in Florida.190 the court stated: “to establish a claim under 
the Wiretap statute, the persons bringing suit must be Florida residents or the 
improper ‘interception’ must have occurred in Florida.”191 the Florida wiretap 
statutes define “intercept” as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any 
wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, 
or other device.”192 that definition would seem to mean that an interception occurs 
189. See supra notes 72–97 and infra notes 190–205 and accompanying text.
190. Cohen, 872 so. 2d at 324.
191. Id. (emphasis added). It is unclear where the court found the Florida resident basis for a lawsuit. also, 
the court incorrectly considered the expectation of privacy in analyzing the taping of a telephone 
conversation.
192. Fla. stat. § 934.02(3) (2009).
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in the state in which the taping is physically done. However, in Cohen, Florida applied 
“intercept” to mean the state in which the plaintiff was located when plaintiff ’s 
telephone conversation was surreptitiously recorded. according to the Cohen court, 
“an ‘interception’ occurs ‘where the words or the communication is uttered, not where 
it is recorded or heard.’”193
 In deciding Cohen, the Florida supreme Court relied on a case it decided nine 
years earlier involving the taping of a cordless telephone conversation. In that case, 
State v. Mozo,194 the court decided that the interception occurs where the words are 
spoken.195 Mozo involved a police officer using a scanner to surreptitiously tape Joyce 
Mozo’s cordless telephone conversation while she was at home.196 at the time the 
conversation was taped, the Florida wiretapping statutes did not explicitly cover 
cordless telephone conversations.197
 Because of Florida’s traditional interest in privacy, both under the Florida 
wiretapping statutes and privacy provisions under the Florida Constitution, the 
Florida supreme Court struggled to protect Mozo’s cordless telephone conversation. 
the court found that the cordless telephone conversation was protected as an oral 
communication because Mozo had a reasonable expectation of privacy while speaking 
in her home. It was in this context that the court stated that the police intercepted 
the conversation in Mozo’s home.198 
 the Mozo court referenced United States v. Nelson199 in support of its statement 
that Mozo’s telephone call was intercepted where it originated. the Nelson court, 
however, did not state that a telephone call was intercepted where the words were 
spoken, but that “the term ‘intercept’ as it relates to ‘aural acquisitions’ refers to the 
place where a communication is initially obtained regardless of where the 
communication is ultimately heard.”200 In Nelson, a Florida judge had authorized 
wiretapping devices to be placed in Clay County, Florida. telephone conversations 
were taped in Clay County and subsequently transmitted to alachua County, Florida, 
193. Cohen, 872 so. 2d at 324 (citations omitted).
194. 655 so. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1995).
195. Id. at 1117. “the actual ‘interception’ of a communication occurs not where such is ultimately heard or 
recorded but where the communication originates.” Id. (citation omitted).
196. Id. at 1115–16.
197. See Carol M. Bast, Cordless Telephones: If You Can’t Say Something Nice, You Might Want to Send a Letter, 
32 Crim. l. Bull. 403 (1996). this was because cordless telephones were a newer technology, and 
cordless telephone conversations were fairly easy to tape using a scanner purchased in a retail store. Id. 
at 408–09. Prior to 2000, the radio portion of a cordless telephone conversation was explicitly excluded 
from the definitions of a wire communication and an electronic communication. In 2000, those 
definitions were amended to remove the exclusion. See 2000 Fla. laws ch. 2000-369, § 8. thus, under 
the present Florida wiretapping statutes, a cordless telephone conversation, if transmitted by analog 
signal is protected as a wire communication, Fla. stat. § 934.02(1) (2009), or if transmitted as a digital 
signal is protected as an electronic communication, Fla. stat. § 934.02(12) (2009).
198. Mozo, 655 so. 2d at 1117.
199. 837 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1988).
200. Id. at 1527.
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where police officers listened to the conversations.201 the Nelson court’s interpretation 
meant that the interception occurred where the calls were taped, and therefore, the 
Nelson court ruled that the lower court correctly refused to suppress the wiretapped 
calls.202
 one Florida intermediate appellate court stated that it would be inappropriate in 
other wiretapping cases not involving a cordless telephone conversation to limit the 
term “interception” to the location in which the words were spoken. In 1998, in State 
v. McCormick, the court stated that interception occurs where the words are spoken 
and where the conversation is taped.203 the issue in that case was whether the court 
order for a wiretap on a cellular telephone covered the taping of 1,400 calls, where 
the taping occurred in Melbourne, Florida, or where the suspect was speaking on the 
cellular telephone, which may have been outside the jurisdiction of the court. Because 
the McCormick court found that the interception did occur where the calls were 
taped, the wiretapping was appropriately authorized.204 the following year in 
Thompson v. State,205 another intermediate appellate court stated that neither Mozo 
nor Nelson was applicable to a telephone call between Florida and Illinois, where the 
Florida police taped the conversation with the permission of the Florida participant.
 B. Tort Statutes That Regulate Conduct and Tort Statutes That Allocate Loss
 at least one commentator differentiates between tort statutes that regulate 
conduct and tort statutes that allocate loss, suggesting that a court should consider 
violations of conduct-regulating tort statutes differently from violations of loss-
allocating tort statutes. He hypothesizes that with a conduct-regulating tort statute, 
the court pays closer attention to the locations of the tort and the resulting injury, 
whereas a court faced with applying a loss-allocating statute is more cognizant of the 
parties’ ties to other jurisdictions.206 other ties might include the domicile of the 
parties and the location of their business dealings.
 It is interesting to explore this distinction between conduct-regulating and loss-
allocating statutes to determine if the distinction is helpful to a court attempting to 
201. Id. at 1526.
202. Id. at 1527.
203. 719 so. 2d 1220, 1222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. app. 1998). “[t]he ‘interception’ of a cellular call occurs both at 
the location of the tapped telephone and at the site where law enforcement authorities hear and record 
the call. . . .” Id.
204. Id. at 1221–23.
205. 731 so. 2d 819, 820 (Fla. Dist. Ct. app. 1999). For further discussion of this case, see supra note 173.
206. symeonides, Choice of law revolution, supra note 17, at 138. In its 2006 decision concerning 
surreptitious taping of a Georgia-California telephone conversation, the California supreme Court 
provided a fascinating review of several prior California conflict of law cases. See Kearney, 137 P.3d at 
922–28. In applying the governmental interest analysis espoused by California, the California supreme 
Court, in all but one of the cases, found that the results in those cases seem to demonstrate the hypothesis 
that the focus will be on the location of the injury under a conduct-regulating statute, while the focus 
will be on the domicile of the parties under a loss-regulating statute. Id.
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decide a case involving conf lict of law and surreptitious taping of telephone 
conversations. the initial question is whether the wiretapping statutes are conduct-
regulating statutes or loss-allocating statutes. a further question is whether the above 
hypothesis is proven to be true in decided wiretapping cases.
 Wiretapping statutes are generally designed to protect the privacy of a party to a 
telephone conversation, while allowing the government to gather information in 
certain circumstances. Wiretapping statutes prohibit surreptitious taping of a 
telephone conversation unless at least one party consents to the taping. an exception 
to this prohibition, however, allows the government to surreptitiously tape a telephone 
conversation after obtaining a court order. although the requirements to obtain a 
court order vary by jurisdiction, it is generally much more difficult to obtain a 
wiretapping court order than to obtain a search warrant.207
 the individual whose telephone conversation was surreptitiously taped has 
suffered a loss of privacy at the time of the taping and may suffer an additional loss 
of privacy if the tape is played or the information from the telephone conversation is 
used or publicized. Depending on the subject matter of the conversation, the 
individual whose telephone conversation was surreptitiously taped may suffer an 
additional loss from the disclosure of secrets discussed during the conversation. an 
example of an additional loss might be the disclosure of a trade secret or other 
confidential information, giving someone an advantage the person would not have 
had, but for the confidential information being disclosed.
 thus, it appears that wiretapping statutes are primarily conduct-regulating in 
nature, although the availability of a private action to the person whose telephone 
conversation was taped without the person’s consent is loss-allocating in nature. the 
availability of punitive damages is another indication that the wiretapping statutes 
are primarily conduct-regulating in nature.208 
 an examination of the civil cases discussed in this paper leads to the conclusion 
that the wiretapping statutes are primarily conduct-regulating in nature because each 
decision focused either on the location of the person whose privacy had been invaded 
(California, Connecticut, and Florida) or the location of the taping (Florida, New 
York, Pennsylvania, texas, and Washington).
VIII. ANALYSIS
 a typical tort case is one involving an automobile accident with personal injuries 
and property damage resulting from a driver’s negligent failure to comply with traffic 
ordinances. surreptitious interception is different than the typical tort case because 
an invasion of privacy involving the taping of a telephone conversation by a participant 
in the conversation is only recognized in ten states. and in most of those ten states, 
taping by a police officer or police informant who is a party to the conversation does 
not violate state statutes. In thirty-nine states, this conduct is not recognized as a tort. 
207. Many government wiretaps have been successfully challenged because of the government’s failure to 
comply with the statutory requirements for obtaining a court order allowing wiretapping.
208. symeonides, Choice of law revolution, supra note 17 at 241.
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 With a typical tort case, a state has an interest in the safety, health, and welfare 
of its citizens. safeguarding these interests maintains the integrity of the state and 
promotes its well-being. to keep its residents safe, the state passes conduct-regulating 
legislation that sets a certain safety standard that one must follow while in the state. 
this safety standard protects state residents and requires the tortfeasor to pay for 
injury caused by not following safety standards.
 additionally, a state likes to attract visitors to the state who bring in additional 
business and help support the state economy. the state must protect the safety of 
those visitors, or they may not return. state conduct-regulating legislation setting 
safety standards also applies equally to visitors.
 another typical tort case involves the tortfeasor creating an unsafe condition, 
which results in physical injury. surreptitious taping of telephone conversations does 
not create an unsafe condition because the impact on the victim is usually emotional, 
although there can be consequential economic damages as well.
 In an automobile accident, the location of the accident is clear (unless the accident 
occurs on the border between states). on the other hand, with surreptitious taping of 
interstate telephone conversations, it is unclear in which state the crucial conduct 
occurred. the crucial action could either be the location of the person complaining 
that the conversation was taped without consent, or the state in which the tape was 
made. Hence, the underlying events may occur in two states, making surreptitious 
taping much different from a typical torts analysis. section 152 of the second 
restatement focuses on the state in which the conversation originated.209 a number 
of states, however, focus on the state in which the interception occurred.210 
 one may raise the question of whether the law of the forum is plaintiff-favoring 
or defendant-favoring. one can speak of the law of an all-party consent state as being 
plaintiff-favoring, but can one speak of the law of a one-party consent state as 
defendant favoring?
 In a case based on a private cause of action for the surreptitious taping of an 
interstate telephone conversation, the plaintiff can choose the forum state. one 
consideration is the ease of filing the lawsuit, with the lawsuit being easier to file and 
maintain in the state where the plaintiff lives, which is often the state where the 
plaintiff was located when the conversation was recorded. another consideration is 
filing the lawsuit in an all-party consent state having ties to the incident. thus, a 
plaintiff who was in a one-party consent state when taped might decide to file the 
lawsuit in the all-party consent state where the defendant taped the conversation. 
this state may also be the state in which the defendant resides.
209. See restatement (second) of Conflict of laws § 152 (1971). one line of Florida cases focuses on 
the state in which the conversation originated. See supra notes 72–94 and accompanying text.
210. Connecticut, New York, texas, Washington, and a second line of cases in Florida focus on the state in 
which the interception occurred. See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Connecticut case; notes 117–24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the New York case; notes 
135–43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the texas case; notes 144–54 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the Washington cases; and notes 190–205 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the second line of Florida cases.
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 Imagine that the defendant was in an all-party consent state when surreptitiously 
taping an interstate telephone conversation. the legal fiction is that one is aware of 
the law governing the person, and theoretically, one should be more aware of the law 
of the state in which one acts, particularly if that is the state where one lives. the 
defendant, however, could have been briefly traveling through the all-party consent 
state when the defendant made the tape. If the defendant were a resident of the all-
party consent state, then the defendant would not have much to justly complain 
about if the plaintiff filed in the all-party consent state. In an all-party consent state, 
a resident surreptitiously tapes a telephone conversation at the resident’s peril. But 
with a small minority of states requiring all-party consent, the defendant who 
surreptitiously tapes a telephone conversation while briefly traveling in the all-party 
consent state might see this as a “gotcha” situation: when the state regulates conduct 
in an unanticipated way only to tempt the unsuspecting defendant to violate the 
statute so that the plaintiff can collect damages. 
 With an interstate taping case, the feeling is slightly different when the plaintiff 
was located in an all-party consent state, and the defendant taped the conversation 
while located in a one-party consent state. the plaintiff will likely file the case in the 
all-party consent state because of both the ease of maintaining the lawsuit there and 
the greater likelihood that the forum state will decide the case under the laws of the 
all-party consent state rather than the laws of the other state. again, because a small 
minority of states require all-party consent, the defendant might see this as a “gotcha” 
situation.
 the Kearney court’s use of the term “gotcha” is memorable because of the contrast 
between the colloquial nature of the term and the otherwise formal language of the 
opinion, together with the associated unfairness and injustice of the children’s 
game.211 the unfairness of the “gotcha” situation stems from the fact that the person 
setting up the scheme (“the schemer”) is aware that a reasonable person will fall 
victim to the scheme only because the victim is unaware of the rules governing it, 
and the schemer has decided to lay in wait to trap the victim. the situation might 
not be perceived as unfair, however, if the rules were established out of a safety 
concern, and the victim should have known about the rules.
 a speed trap in a small town that interstate traffic frequents is an example of a 
gotcha situation. allegedly, the small town passes an ordinance requiring motorists 
to slow down when traveling through the town because it is concerned about the 
safety of town pedestrians and motorists. But the posted speed limit is lower than 
motorists typically see when passing through similar small towns, and the small 
town vigorously enforces the speed limit, levying fines for any motorist exceeding 
the speed limit by even a few miles. the traffic ordinance does protect the safety of 
town residents, but it may quickly be characterized as a speed trap because of the way 
in which it is enforced, with the real feeling that the town is more interested in 
211. See scott D. Makar, “Proverbially Speaking”: Rotten Apples, Philadelphia Lawyers and Red Cows, 7 U. Fla. 
J.l. & Pub. Pol’y 113 (fall 1994–fall 1995).
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raising revenue from unsuspecting tourists than it is in protecting the safety of 
residents.
 Kearney is an example of a case in which a gotcha claim might arise.212 the 
Georgia defendants were located clear across the country from the California 
plaintiffs. California is often thought of as widely diverging from the rest of the 
country in many of its practices. another viewpoint, of course, is to characterize 
California as a leader, with California testing a new type of legislation that catches 
on in the rest of the states at some later date. the portrayal of California is important 
because in Kearney, the Georgia defendants essentially made the claim to the 
California court that this was a “gotcha” situation in which the court should 
sympathize with them and not apply the California wiretapping statutes. one would 
imagine that, had the California plaintiffs filed the case in Georgia, the Georgia 
court would have applied Georgia law and dismissed the lawsuit. this would be 
particularly true because the taping occurred in Georgia, with the taping being one 
of the critical actions that led to potential liability for the Georgia defendants. the 
Kearney court seemed to struggle with holding the Georgia defendants liable. Instead, 
the court took the middle ground of issuing an injunction and refusing to impose 
damages on the Georgia defendants, while announcing that in future cases, California 
courts would award damages to California residents whose telephone conversations 
were secretly taped. 
 the Kearney court probably had no other choice because it wanted to uphold the 
privacy principle of the California statute and protect its residents, but it sympathized 
with the plight of the Georgia defendants because this conflict of law issue had not 
previously been decided. the Kearney court also seemed to be influenced by the fact 
that the defendants were employees of salomon smith Barney, a large brokerage 
firm with a nationwide business that should have warned its brokers across the nation 
not to tape telephone calls without all-party consent.213 the Kearney court added 
some curious language at the end of the opinion, which limited the opinion to the 
facts in the case.214 this language might be interpreted to mean that, even after 
Kearney, a California court might have some leeway to refrain from vigorously 
applying the California wiretapping statutes to an unsuspecting private individual 
from a one-party consent state who surreptitiously records a single telephone call 
212. See supra notes 56–63.
213. In fact, salomon smith Barney’s legal counsel may have been delinquent in not issuing such a warning 
nationwide.
214. Kearney, 137 P.3d at 939 n.18. the court stated:
[B]ecause this case does not involve the isolated recording of a personal telephone call 
by an out-of-state individual in a nonbusiness setting, or the recording of a phone call 
by an out-of-state business that has a reasonable, individualized basis for believing that 
a particular caller is engaged in criminal or wrongful conduct, we have no occasion to 
determine how the comparative impairment analysis would apply in those or other 
comparable settings.
 Id.
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with a California resident. the California supreme Court further noted that this 
was a civil and not a criminal case.
 of course, the surreptitious taping claim may be among other reasons for filing 
the lawsuit. In some cases, the surreptitious claim is either filed as a counter-claim, 
arises after the lawsuit is already filed when one party seeks to make the substance of 
the telephone conversation inadmissible, or is raised by the criminal defendant in a 
criminal case. In those types of cases, the forum was not chosen based on the 
likelihood of the court applying the wiretapping statutes of a particular state, but the 
forum was chosen for other reasons.
 What is the public policy concerning surreptitiously taping telephone calls? What 
norms do we share concerning whether a party to a telephone conversation should be 
allowed to surreptitiously tape the conversation? Is it reasonable for an all-party 
consent wiretapping statute to apply under the particular circumstances? What is the 
consensus about where the privacy line should be drawn? What if application of the 
conflict of law approach of the state would cause the state to decide a case in a way 
that does not seem reasonable based on the particular circumstances? should a court 
impose civil liability on an “innocent” individual who surreptitiously taped a telephone 
conversation? should a court deciding a criminal case suppress the single piece of 
evidence that would lead to a murder conviction when the all-party consent statute 
would cause a surreptitiously taped and incriminating telephone conversation to be 
inadmissible? should a court convict an “innocent” individual who surreptitiously 
taped a telephone conversation? 
 an overwhelming majority of the states allow taping based on one-party consent. 
therefore, many individuals are unaware that taping a telephone conversation may 
be illegal and may subject them to civil as well as criminal penalties in all-party 
consent states. requiring all-party consent may be seen as irrationally overprotective 
of those plaintiffs from all-party consent states—the proverbial quicksand or pitfall 
waiting to claim its next victim.
 of course, an all-party consent state like California would characterize its law as 
superior to the law of one-party consent states because it protects the privacy of its 
residents, and the state would also characterize the laws of one-party consent states 
as inferior because the laws of those states fail to protect the privacy of those speaking 
on the telephone.
 a business, especially a business operating nationwide, should be aware of 
significant differences in the law of the various states that could subject the business 
to liability. that type of business probably carries insurance to protect it against loss 
caused by its actions that f ly in the face of the law of another state.
 surreptitious taping is much different than the typical tort based on an automobile 
accident because, in the typical situation, the person taping intends to tape the 
telephone conversation. the Gonzalez case was an atypical situation in which 
Penniman did not press the play button prior to taping; however, Penniman’s action 
could still be characterized as intentional because he was speaking on his home 
telephone and knew that the telephone service automatically recorded the balance of 
the conversation after the voice mail message started. In Perry, the twenty-two 
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second conversation that tied the hit man to the person who had hired the hit man 
was also automatically recorded on an answering machine. although the post-
conviction court found that the taping was inadvertent, the Maryland court of last 
resort found that the taping was not inadvertent. In contrast, a person involved in an 
automobile accident does not normally plan to get in an accident, and the accident 
may be caused by negligence, such as driving too fast for the road conditions.
 one of the criteria in the second restatement is predictability of results in 
cases.215 a negligent tortfeasor may not have tailored his actions to guard against 
liability imposed in similar situations in decided cases, but one who surreptitiously 
tapes a telephone call is in a different category. the legal fiction is that we are aware 
of legal prohibitions. thus, one who surreptitiously tapes a telephone call does so at 
that person’s peril, especially if the taping is done in an all-party consent state. a 
court, however, might have sympathy for a defendant who taped a telephone 
conversation while briefly in an all-party consent state or for a defendant who taped 
a telephone conversation while in a one-party consent state while the other party to 
the conversation was in an all-party consent state. after Kearney, a California court 
would not be loathe to sanction a business operating in California with stiff monetary 
damages for surreptitiously taping a telephone call, either when the taping occurs in 
California or the person whose telephone conversation was surreptitiously taped is 
located in California. 
 In the criminal context, application of a state wiretapping statute may cause 
crucial evidence to be excluded. some cases, like Windhurst, are relatively easy to 
decide, while other cases, like Thompson, Perry, Mustafa, Gonzalez, Fleming, and 
Fowler, are much more difficult, especially if they involve serious criminal charges, 
such as murder and sexual battery on a very young minor. a court may be faced with 
the proverbial “hard case” and have to decide whether it should create an exception, 
thereby achieving a fair result in the case but making “bad law.” should fundamental 
fairness prevail or should the court follow a clearly-cut legal principle?
 It is interesting to note that not one of the criminal cases discussed in this paper 
involved criminal wiretapping charges. In other words, in no case did the prosecution 
attempt to convict someone for illegally and surreptitiously taping an interstate 
telephone conversation. one might imagine a court in an all-party consent state 
convicting someone for surreptitiously taping an interstate telephone conversation if 
the taping occurred in an all-party consent state. It would be possible for an all-party 
consent state to prosecute someone for surreptitiously taping an interstate telephone 
conversation if the person whose conversation was taped was located in an all-party 
consent state, and if the taping occurred in a one-party consent state; however, as 
indicated by the Kearney court, the prosecution would very likely be loathe to bring 
such a charge because of problems with jurisdiction and the constitutionality of 
securing a conviction.
215. See restatement (second) of Conflict of laws § 6(2)(f) (1971).
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IX. CONCLUSION
 If people are to look to the law for guidance, they need to be able to predict how 
a court will decide a case. thus, they are seeking a certain amount of stability in the 
law. a legal principle can be so stable that it appears almost rigid. a stable legal 
principle provides guidance but does not allow a certain amount of needed flexibility. 
a stable but rigid legal principle can produce unwarranted results. With a stable but 
rigid legal principle, a court struggles when deciding a moderately challenging case, 
not to mention a very challenging case. 
 thus, besides being fairly stable, the law must be able to deal effectively with at 
least a moderately difficult case. one way to provide a court with the needed 
f lexibility is to instruct the court to examine a number of factors in reaching a 
decision. allowing the court to examine a number of factors provides the court with 
enough leeway to reach the right result, perhaps even in the very challenging case. 
the problem with giving a court this amount of added f lexibility is that it may 
appear that the court has been given free reign, leaving people without guidance as 
to how a court will decide a future case.
 as this paper shows, little about interstate taping seems predictable except that it 
would not be wise to tempt fate by surreptitiously taping a telephone conversation 
with a California resident. two other truisms are: (1) if you want to escape liability, 
never tape a telephone conversation without all-party consent, and (2) never talk 
about anything incriminating during a telephone conversation.
 a number of states have no decisions that one can rely on in predicting whether 
one could be liable for surreptitiously taping a conversation or whether an 
incriminating conversation would be suppressed. Even in those states with decisions, 
many of the decisions are from trial-level or intermediate appellate courts, with no 
decisions from the state court of last resort. Florida is an example of a state with no 
clear precedent because there are two different lines of cases decided by Florida 
intermediate appellate courts. one will not have a clear idea what the law is in Florida 
until a surreptitious taping case is decided by the Florida supreme Court.
 In examining the surreptitious interstate taping cases, there is no evidence of a 
trend except that a small minority of states vigorously defends the right to require 
all-party consent prior to someone taping a telephone conversation. thus, the tension 
often present in the law between stability and f lexibility seems nowhere more 
apparent than in the conflict of law area, perhaps because conflict of law necessarily 
requires a court, in making its decision, to examine the law of at least two 
jurisdictions.
